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Abstract
Th is paper explores the implications for creating a U.S. history narrative from a 
Rortyan perspective. First, we review Rorty’s social theory. Second, we discuss im-
plications of his ideas regarding the creation of a U.S. history narrative based upon 
his ideas. Finally, we examine two concerns that would likely emerge if a Rortyan 
U.S. history curriculum were taught in our public schools.
Scholars have a history of crossing intellectual borders (Abbott, 2001). In particular, 
educators draw from a diversity of intellectuals upon which to base our understand-
ing of, for example, schools and society, curriculum content, teaching, and learn-
ing. In addition to icons such as Marx, James, Freud, and Dewey, the works of the 
Frankfurt School (e.g., Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse), Foucault, Gilligan, Derrida, 
Gramsci, West, Arendt, and Fraser, just to name a few, have been used to guide our 
scholarship and practice. However, with the exception of few scholars (e.g., Peters 
& Ghiraldelli, 2001), one of America’s most controversial scholars,1 Richard Rorty, 
has been largely ignored. Th is situation is unfortunate in that Rorty provides several 
ideas that would benefi t our eff orts to reconceptualize U.S. history curriculum. As 
Jenkins (1995) argues, “For history (and history education) to be credible, it must . . 
. fi t into the sort of intellectual debates Rorty exemplifi es” (p. 99). He goes on to note 
that several historians have come to appreciate the potential of Rorty’s thinking in 
relation to the fi eld of history. However, this attention with some exceptions (e.g., 
Barton & Levstik, 2004) has been lacking among history educators. In response, the 
purpose of this paper is to review some of the major themes in Rorty’s social theory 
and then explore its implications regarding the narrative of U.S. history education. 
For the purpose of this paper, we defi ne narrative as the underlining story that holds 
a history together and keeps it from becoming a mere presentation of disjointed 
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people, places, and events. In particular, we examine several challenges of creating 
of a narrative that binds us together as a people, that honors the diverse ancestral 
heritages from which we came to this land, and perhaps most diffi  cult of all, that 
fi nds a way to educate children about our nation that doesn’t dwell or avoid the dark 
side of our history.  Finally, we examine some concerns regarding the implementa-
tion of a Rortyan U.S. history curriculum. In doing so, we add our voice to recent 
eff orts (e.g., Cohen, Epstein, Mattson,  & Turk, 2009; Gerwin & Zevin, 2009; Rag-
land & Woestman, 2009) to make the teaching of this subject more intellectually 
engaging and meaningful to our students in public schools.
Rorty’s Social Theory 
Rorty wrote nine books and dozens of papers on numerous topics, and thus, it is 
beyond the scope of this one paper to address his entire body of work. As a result, 
we limit our focus to his social theory as a basis for discussing the potential value 
(or lack thereof) of his ideas for U.S. history curriculum.
Anti-Foundationalism 
Perhaps the central motif of Rorty’s social theory is his (1980) comprehensive cri-
tique of “truth” as timeless and immutable information. Rorty is especially indebted 
to Dewey’s pragmatic (Dewey, 1920; Rorty, 1982, 1991; Kadlec, 2007) perspective 
of knowledge as the “by-product” of our symbolic interaction with the environ-
ment. As we interact with our surroundings, we interpret the experience and create 
knowledge for the purpose of enhancing our lives. Ironically, the more complex the 
organism, the greater are the interactive options it has in relating to its environ-
ment, and thus the more uncertainty exists in determining the most fruitful course 
of action. Historical refl ection can help, but there is no certainty in this process. 
Ideas are best viewed as merely “tools that equip us with beliefs for coping with our 
environment” rather than accurate representations of “reality” with a capital “R” 
(Peters & Ghiraldelli, 2001, p. 3).
Rorty’s social theory has no fi xed, eternal, universal, or essential “Truths.” 
Like Dewey (1920), he suggested we replace our quest for Truth with “warranted 
assertabilities,” that is, ideas that enrich and deepen our existence over time and 
in light of human experience.2 However, unlike many post-modernists, Rorty rec-
ognized the contingent “truth” (lower-case “t”) embedded in the social contract 
that exists between people at a given time and location. Rorty suggests that truth 
merely refl ects the intellectual solidarity of a particular group’s values, knowledge, 
and ways of acting that are taken for granted as “normal” within it. Some of these 
ideas are codifi ed into “laws,” while others are informal “understandings” such as 
“proper manners” (Elias, 1982). 
Rorty’s rejection of Truth extends to his understanding of social morality. 
His pragmatism encourages us to be highly skeptical of actions based on claims of 
moral righteousness. “For the pragmatist in morals, the claim that the customs of 
a given society are ‘grounded in human nature’ is not one which he knows how to 
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argue about. He is a pragmatist because he cannot see what it would be like for a 
custom to be so grounded” (Rorty, 1980, p. 178). For Rorty (1989), morals are merely 
refl ections of a given community’s solidarity.
Sellar’s thesis is that morality is a matter of what he calls “we-intentions,” 
that the core meaning of “immoral action” is “the sort of thing we (quoted 
italics) don’t do.” An immoral action is . . . the sort of thing which, if done at 
all, is done only by animals, or by people of other families, tribes, cultures, 
or historical epochs. If . . . done repeatedly by one of us, that person ceases 
to be one of us. She becomes an outcast, someone who doesn’t speak our 
language, even though she may once have appeared to do so. On Sellar’s 
account, as on Hegel’s, moral philosophy takes the form of an answer to 
the question “Who are ‘we,’ how did we come to be what we are, and what 
might we become?: rather than an answer to the question “What rules 
should dictate my actions?” In other words, moral philosophy takes the 
form of historical narration and utopian speculation rather than a search 
for general principles. (p. 59) 
In response to accusations of nihilistic relativism (e.g., Best & Kellner, 2001; Case, 
1995; Haack, 1995; Machan, 1996), Rorty (1999) states, 
Critics of moral relativism think that unless there is something absolute, 
something which shares God’s implacable refusal to yield to human weak-
ness, we have no reason to go on resisting evil. If evil is merely a lesser good, 
if all moral choice is a compromise between confl icting goods, then, they 
say, there is no point in moral struggle. Th e lives of those who have died 
resisting injustice become pointless. But to us pragmatists moral struggle 
is continuous with the struggle for existence, and no sharp break divides 
the unjust from the imprudent, the evil from the inexpedient. What mat-
ters for pragmatists is devising ways of diminishing human suff ering and 
increasing human equality, increasing the ability of all human children 
to start life with an equal chance of happiness. Th is goal is not written in 
the stars, and is no more an expression of what Kant called “pure practical 
reason” than it is the Will of God. It is a goal worth dying for, but it does 
not require backup from supernatural forces. Th e pragmatist view of what 
opponents of pragmatism call “fi rm moral principles” is that such prin-
ciples are abbreviations of past practices - ways of summing up the habits 
of the ancestors we most admire. (p. xxix)
Rorty’s pragmatism challenges us to work for meaningful reform, guided by values, 
without the intellectual security that our eff orts or values will ultimately result in 
the resolution of a given ill, be it racism, poverty, war, or poor education.
Rorty (1989) suggests we develop a strong sense of irony to keep us from view-
ing our “fi nal vocabulary” as foundational rather than contingent. He (1989) calls 
people “ironists” who realize 
that anything can be made to look good or bad by being redescribed, and 
their renunciation of the attempt to formulate criteria of choice between 
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fi nal vocabularies, puts them in the position which Sartre call “meta-stable”: 
never quite able to take themselves seriously because they are always aware 
that the terms in which they describe themselves are subject to change, 
always aware of the contingency and fragility of their fi nal vocabularies, 
and thus of their selves. (pp. 73-74)
Ironically, Rorty’s “foundation” (as a lower-case “truth”) is that there is no foun-
dational knowledge or morality. It is not that ironists don’t have a set of ideas that 
they assume are correct; rather, it’s just that they understand that their “cannon” is 
temporal, transient, and self created. As Forster (1992) suggests, we would be wise to 
adopt Rorty’s call for “better and worse descriptions” rather than truth or falsity.
Leftist Patriotism 
Perhaps Rorty’s most contentious project was his eff ort to reclaim a sense of national 
identity and patriotism from a progressive/left ist perspective. Rorty’s patriotism 
is not connected to our government, a particular political party or leader, or the 
boundaries of our nation. For Rorty, patriotism represents a commitment to the 
“American experiment,” a nation that rejects cruelty and works towards establishing 
a more liberal, critical, and social democracy (Goodman, 2006). Rorty’s patriotism 
is particularly diffi  cult to accept given the “conservative restoration” that has taken 
place in our country (e.g., Gabbard, 2008; Goodman, 2006) for much of the last 
three decades, and in particular, the foreign and domestic policies of George W. 
Bush’s administration, which was arguably the most conservative, arrogant, and 
dangerously inept in our nation’s history. Nevertheless, Rorty (1998) challenges 
those of us with progressive values to follow the example of Dewey, Jeff erson, and 
Whitman, who found pride in our nation’s experiment, despite its past and present 
failures, acts of cruelty, and shameful policies. 
Like many western philosophers (going back to Kant), Rorty views nations 
as collective subjects, and as such, they are similar to individuals. “National pride 
is to countries what self-respect is to individuals: a necessary condition for self-
improvement” (1998, p. 3). He goes on to argue that like individuals, nation-states 
have histories that foster shame or pride, and unless the latter “outweighs shame” 
(p. 3), it is extremely diffi  cult for a nation to improve. Rorty wants to create a new, 
national narrative that will redescribe America in ways that the left  can embrace 
and be used to forge a new progressive notion of who “we” are.
In particular, Rorty wants to embrace a national “we” as a more eff ective 
response to the marginalization and otherization that still exists in our society 
rather than an emphasis on critical arguments or scientifi c information. In addi-
tion to having an individual identity, we also have any number of collective iden-
tities rooted in our families, ancestral heritages, gender, sexual orientation, age, 
skin color, and occupation, among other things. Typically, an individual will feel a 
greater connection to and care about people who share one or more of their collec-
tive identities than to those who do not. Rorty (1998) has advocated for the devel-
opment of a collective identity based upon our nation state, to the degree that this 
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collective identity acknowledges our diversity as a people and is committed to the 
politics of inclusion and social justice. Rorty calls for the left  to justify its advocacy 
for equality, opportunity, inclusion, respect, and care-giving not upon a particular 
economic class, system, or “humanity,” but upon our national identity. If this iden-
tity took hold fi rmly among the electorate, then as Americans, “we” simply would 
not allow 20% of our children to live in poverty or to attend grossly inadequate 
schools, for a signifi cant number of our society to go without basic medical care, 
or for citizens be marginalized or otherized based upon their skin color, ethnicity, 
body type, gender, or sexual orientation (because these diff erences pale compared 
to our bonds of nationhood). 
Although most people on the left  have followed in Kant’s, Hegel’s, and Marx’s 
footsteps and identifi ed “humanity” as the ultimate “we,” Rorty disagrees.3 While 
not ruling out the possibility that people will one day embrace all of humanity as 
“us,” Rorty (1989) thinks at this time, it’s better to use our national identity as a 
catalyst for facing our societal problems.
Consider . . . the unending hopelessness and misery of the lives of the 
young Blacks in American cities. Do we say that these people must be 
helped because they are our fellow human beings? We may, but it is much 
more persuasive, morally as well as politically, to describe them as our 
fellow Americans—to insist that it is outrageous that an American should 
live without hope. (p. 191)
Th is national “we” would create conditions for members of diff erent collective iden-
tities to have confl icts, but yet to embrace one another as “us,” rather than “them.” 
In this way, people can engage in struggle over public interests, but this antagonism 
is modifi ed by our union, which is based upon geography and the imperfect social 
contract under which we agree to live.
To achieve this vision of left ist patriotism, Rorty (1989, 1998, 1999) wants to 
place progressive campaigns such as the women’s suff rage and liberation movements 
(Kessler-Harris, 2001; Rosen, 2001), the public education movement (Katz, 1968), the 
labor and anti-trust movements (Himmelberg, 1994; Lichtenstein, 2002), the civil 
rights movement (Olson, 2001), the ecology movement (Fox, 1986), the health and 
consumer safety movement (Storrs, 2000), and the antiwar movement (Garfi nkle, 
1995) at the core of what the United States has been and will strive to become.  
Rorty emphasizes that these and other struggles are representative of eff orts 
to improve upon, rather than destroy, our society. Rorty wants to reclaim left ist 
reformism instead of the more romantic vision of a revolutionary left  seeking to 
destroy and then transform society. Unfortunately, from Rorty’s perspective, the 
new left  of the 1960s did not embrace this reformist tradition, turning instead to 
Marxist-Leninist revolution (e.g., Elbaum, 2002; Hook, 1975; Gitlin, 1993; Isserman 
& Kazin, 2000; Kurlansky, 2004) which, unintentionally, contributed the previously 
mentioned conservative restoration. 
E&C ?  Education and Culture
8  ?  Jesse Goodman, Sarah Montgomery, and Connie Ables
Marxism, Revolution, & Reform  
Although Rorty grew up in a house of Trotskyites (Gross, 2008), as he matured, he 
came to a similar conclusion as Dewey (Moreno & Frey, 1985; Rodrigues, 2001) re-
garding Marxism. Rather than wanting to destroy capitalist society, he embraced the 
twentieth-century liberal package of government regulated capitalism, progressive 
taxation, a social welfare system, a commitment to private spaces and activities, and 
a reciprocal foreign policy (Rorty, 1998, 1999). For many Marxists, however, (e.g., 
Allman, 2001; Brosio, 1994; McLaren, Farahmandpur, & Suoranta, 2001), statements 
such as the one below still elicit cries of heresy.  
It is impossible to discuss left ist politics in the twentieth century, in any 
country, without saying something about Marxism. For Marxism was not 
only a catastrophe for all the countries in which Marxists took power, but 
a disaster for the reformist Left  in all the countries in which they did not. . 
. . For us Americans, it is important not to let Marxism infl uence the story 
we tell about our own Left . We should repudiate the Marxist insinuation 
that only those who are convinced capitalism must be overthrown can 
count as left ists, and that everybody else is a wimpy liberal, a self-deceiving 
bourgeois reformer. (Rorty, 1998, pp. 41-42)
Although he recognized the important role the new left  played in ending the Viet-
nam War and fi ghting racism, Rorty became disturbed by its rejection of the Ameri-
can experiment. 
Rorty suggests that the radicalization of the 1960s new left  came at a heavy 
price, namely, the alienation of a large majority of citizens who might have been 
sympathetic to progressive ideals, but who were deeply disaff ected by the rantings 
of the 1960s youth politics (e.g., Garfi nkle, 1995; Gitlin, 1993; Isserman & Kazin, 
2000). Rorty would likely share Ambrose’s (1995) lament that 1960s’ progressives 
had a chance to create a genuine party of the left  in America, but instead it 
took its opportunity . . . to riot, to scandalize, to do drugs and group sex, 
to talk and dress dirty, to call for revolution and burn fl ags, to condemn 
parents and indeed anyone over 30 years of age, in an excess of free will and 
childish misjudgment seldom matched and never exceeded. To the partici-
pants, it provided intensity of feeling and was great fun. To the potential 
antiwar members of the middle class, it was a turn-off . (p. vii)
By calling for the overthrow of the system, the new left  created a politics long on 
generalized and reductionist criticisms, but hopelessly short on viable alternatives.4 
In addition, radical left ists almost never want to recognize the ways in which the 
United States (as a result of coalition politics) has become more democratic, pro-
vided higher living standards for even the poorest among us, broadened our civil 
rights, become more inclusive, reduced bigotry and stereotyping, and provided 
more educational and occupational options for its citizens. Although the United 
States continues to struggle with destroying the environment, racism, sexism, un-
justifi ed income disparity, imperialist adventures, along with many other social 
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problems and ills, Rorty (1998) challenged us to view the United States as “illimit-
able,” and noted that despite its numerous (and at times villainous) shortcomings, 
it is “a good example of the best kind of society so far invented” (qtd. in Peters & 
Ghiraldelli, 2001, p. 4).  
To summarize, Rorty wanted to liberate the American left  from “revolution-
ary Marxism.” He (1998) wanted to reclaim the presixties, “reformist left ,” that is, 
individuals who “struggled within the framework of constitutional democracy to 
protect the weak from the strong” (p. 43). 
We . . . did not need Marx to show us the need for (income) redistribution, 
or to tell us that the state was oft en little more than the executive com-
mittee of the rich and powerful. . . . It would be a good thing if the next 
generation of American left ists found . . . little resonance in the names of 
Karl Marx and Vladimir Ilyich Lenin. . . . It would be even better . . . if the 
names of Ely and Croly, Dreiser and Debs, A. Philip Randolph and John 
L. Lewis were more familiar to these left ists. . . . For it would be a big help 
to American eff orts for social justice if each new generation were able to 
think of itself as participating in a movement which has lasted for more 
than a century, and has served human liberty well. . . . Each new genera-
tion of students ought to think of American left ism as having a long and 
glorious history. Th ey should be able to see, as Whitman and Dewey did, 
the struggle for social justice as central to their country’s moral identity. 
(Rorty,1998, pp. 48, 51)
For Rorty, the romantic desire for the revolution lost its appeal long ago. In its place, 
he called for a reinvigorated, progressive reformism to tackle the many problems 
we face as a nation. 
Rorty and the Narrative of U.S. History Curriculum 
Perhaps the most important implication from Rorty’s work concerns the narra-
tive in most U.S. history classes. Th e vast majority of U.S. history textbooks and 
courses present students with an ethnically narrow, linear, and celebratory story of 
our nation’s growing power and development. Drawing upon Wertsch’s (2005) and 
O’Connor’s (Wertsch & O’Connor, 1991) work, VanSledright (2008) nicely sum-
marizes what Barton and Levstik (2004) call the “master narrative.”
Persecuted Anglos fl ed Europe and their oppressive overlords and traveled 
to the New World in search of freedom. Th e birth of the United States . . . 
was the culmination of a struggle to overthrow European-imposed tyran-
nies and establish a new nation founded on individual liberty and unfet-
tered pursuits of happiness. Following this birth, a period of two centuries 
ensued in which the people further distanced themselves from the Old 
World, hunting limitless progress as they expanded and settled the vast 
expanse that was western North America. With copious amounts of hard 
work and the goal of individual liberty beckoning them from every horizon, 
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patriots and pioneers threw off  their Old World trappings and were born 
anew. Th e nation they built stood for liberty, democracy, and the right to 
live and produce all their minds and hearts could desire, unobstructed by 
a government that tampered with their yearnings. . . . Th e result was a na-
tion populated by freedom seekers, who created the best and most power-
ful . . . nation . . . the world had yet to see. (p. 123)
Th e main actors of this narrative are Anglo men, and it emphasizes the celebratory 
myths and legends of our nation such as victorious wars, territorial exploration 
and expansion, political rights, economic development, scientifi c breakthroughs, 
literary accomplishments, and artistic achievements (Loewen, 1995). Th is narra-
tive also suggests that the children of European immigrants who later came to this 
country were able to blend relatively easily into this narrative (the melting pot) and 
a thus become Americans. Although during the last thirty years there has been an 
eff ort to be more inclusive by mentioning (oft en in text sidebars) the contributions 
of women and people of color who have come (voluntarily or not) to this country, 
U.S. history courses generally ignore the trials, oppression, exclusion, and travails 
that most immigrants experienced in our past, the ethno-racial, gender, and other 
class confl icts that are deeply woven in our nation’s history, as well as most contro-
versies that have surrounded signifi cant historical events (e.g., Foster, 2006; Fried-
man & Kenney, 2005; Gabaccia, 1997; Gerstle, 1997; Loewen, 1995; Spickard, 2007). 
Some (e.g., Kammen, 1989; Lowenthal, 1998) suggest that what is taught in most 
history classes is more nostalgic heritage than comprehensive history. As such, these 
courses gloss over many of the darker aspects of our nation’s history (e.g., racial 
oppression, un-justifi ed wars, dispossession of pre-Columbian immigrants’ and 
Mexicans’ lands, support for dictators in other countries). As VanSledright (2008) 
states, “An American history . . . reveals the blemishes, leaves rough edges intact, and 
eschews cosmetics. American heritage selects out and papers over those elements 
of the past not conducive to a story line of celebratory successes” (p. 121). As sev-
eral scholars (e.g., Barton, 2001; Bodnar, 1992; Epstein, 2000; Wineburg, Mosborg, 
Porat, & Duncan, 2007) have noted, this nostalgic narrative has been powerfully 
reinforced by our popular culture and mass media. 
Although this narrative attempts to unify our country, its Anglo-heritage 
emphasis has for many students had the opposite impact (Loewen, 1995; Lowen-
thal, 1998, VanSledright, 2008). Epstein (2000) has noted that U.S. history classes 
are alienating to many students with non-European ancestries and lead them to 
the dubious conclusion that there must be a conspiracy to keep people of color in a 
perpetual state of second-class citizenship. Th is reaction seems especially poignant 
when we look at the condition of schools in impoverished neighborhoods. On the 
one hand, students in these schools are taught that our nation is unifi ed and one 
based on freedom and equality, but on the other hand, the condition of their school-
ing tells the opposite story (Kantor & Lowe, 2007).
In addition, by focusing on great national events and heroes, many students 
come to believe that common people have little to do with the making of history, 
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and thus pay little serious attention to it. Given the ancestral pluralism of our peo-
ple, the resistance to our previous melting-pot ideal, and the freedom to express 
widely divergent ideologies it is not unreasonable to ask if we are able to have a 
national narrative. Should we teach U.S. history as a compilation of tribal or parti-
san histories? Should our history emphasize the diversity of our population or our 
unity? Should it explore the dark side of our cultural, governmental, international, 
and military events or continue to focus primarily on celebratory accounts of past 
events and people?
As previously mentioned, Rorty’s work refl ects an eff ort to work through 
some of these challenges. Clearly, Rorty would like to alter the conventional master 
narrative that is taught in our schools. U.S. history does provide an opportunity to 
develop a national identity that Rorty feels is extremely important. Rorty also would 
likely want the history to be celebratory. However, his cast of heroes and important 
events would deviate greatly from what is currently taught. 
First, a Rortyan history would be a narrative of us, that is, the people who 
came here, what experiences they and their descendants have had, and how these 
experiences have shaped the nation we are becoming. Like Spickard (2007), Rorty 
would decenter the Anglo experience from our history.5 Rather than view Anglos 
as Americans and everyone else who migrated to this land as immigrants, people 
(and their descendants) from this particular heritage would be treated as just one of 
the many ethno-racial groups that immigrated and participated in the construction 
of this nation starting with those who fi rst colonized this continent around 10,000 
BCE. Rorty would challenge educators to generate an immigrant U.S. history cur-
riculum that isn’t a story of assimilation into the Anglo heritage, but rather a story 
of ethno-racial-gendered-class confl ict and amalgamation. It would be an account 
of this struggle and blending, resulting in the creation and recreation of the many 
“collective identities” (Goodman, 2006) that make up who we are as Americans. 
A Rortyan history would not be a curriculum made up of tribal narratives 
in which each ethno-racial group (and gender) or region only tells its story. In this 
sense, he would join critics of extreme versions of multiculturalism, such as Schle-
singer (1998), fearing it might pit one ethno-racial group, gender, class, or region 
against others. Rorty did not take our nation’s unity for granted. He recognized 
that the creation of this type of polity is a relatively recent event in human history. 
Although Rorty knew it was far from perfect, he believed a national narrative to be 
better than either tribal or transnational narratives, whether the latter came from 
multinational corporations or Marxist internationalists. He would have agreed 
with VanSledright’s (2008) observation that “[b]uilding and maintaining a nation 
state has long been a precarious undertaking. . . . As a nation of immigrants— some 
voluntary, others forced— it has been diffi  cult to construct and maintain a sense 
of national community” (p. 111). Although arduous, a Rortyan narrative would at-
tempt to address both our diversity and unity. His narrative would emphasize our 
eff orts to create (especially since the end of WWII) a more inclusive society. For 
Rorty (1991), the United States 
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is a culture which prides itself on constantly enlarging its sympathies. . . . 
Its sense of . . . moral worth is founded on its tolerance of diversity. Th e he-
roes it apotheosizes include [although from Rorty’s perspective not nearly 
enough] those who have enlarged its capacity for sympathy and tolerance. 
Among the enemies it diabolizes are the people who attempt to diminish 
this capacity. (p. 204)
Rorty argues that we are now in a position to teach the inclusive history that has 
previously been impossible due to the lack of the public acceptance of our diversity. 
However, given the orientation of most current U.S. history textbooks (Loewen, 
1995) and other aspects of our society (e.g., Cruickshank, 2000), Rorty’s assessment 
is hopeful but debatable.  
In this sense, Rorty wants a U.S. history curriculum that draws upon the fi eld 
of Ethnic Studies and is rooted in our immigrant experiences. However, it is not 
only a story of Anglo-masculine oppression of the immigrants who came to this 
country aft er (or before in the case of Native Americans and Spanish speakers who 
lived in what was northern Mexico) the founding fathers and their ancestors. Un-
like Loewen (1995) and others (e.g, Gerstle, 1997; Zinn, 2003) who seem to prefer a 
U.S. history that emphasizes the many ignominious policies and actions of our na-
tion and its leaders, Rorty recognized that no country’s history curriculum would 
accentuate its shameful events, atrocities, and shortcomings to its young people. 
As several scholars (e.g., Foster & Crawford, 2006; Friedman & Kenney, 2005; Hein 
& Selden, 2000; Seixas, 2004; Stearns, Seixas, & Wineburg, 2000), have noted, no 
country stresses the dark side of its history in its schools. To expect that K-12 U.S. 
history courses would do so would be, from Rorty’s perspective, unrealistic and 
counter-productive. 
A Rortyan U.S. history, however, would not ignore our dark side, but would 
discuss it in ways that foster a national identity. Using a celebratory narrative, Rorty 
would shift  the emphasis of U.S. history courses towards teaching about those indi-
viduals and groups of people who have struggled with each other over controversial 
events. Rorty (1999) wanted a narrative that would help students acquire
an image of themselves as heirs to a tradition of increasing liberty and rising 
hope. . . . We can think of . . . wanting children . . . to think of themselves 
as proud and loyal citizens of a country that slowly and painfully, threw off  
a foreign yoke, freed its slaves, enfranchised its women, restrained its rob-
ber barons and licensed its trade unions, liberalized its religious practices, 
broadened its religious and moral tolerance, and built colleges in which 50 
percent of its population could enroll . . . Dewey wanted the inculcation of 
this narrative of freedom and hope to be the core of the socializing (K-12 
education) process. (pp. 121-122)
U.S. history courses would celebrate the times when struggles for social justice, 
more freedom, and greater democracy were successful. However, they would be 
explored as tentative, imperfect, and in need of more eff ort to keep the American 
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experiment alive. For Rorty (1990) U.S. history should, “get across to the students 
that the emancipation of the slaves, the enfranchisement of women, the rise of the 
trade unions, the development of the welfare state, the woman’s movement, the Civil 
Rights Movement, and the like are episodes in an uncompleted saga” (pp. 42-43). 
Rorty wanted a history curriculum that connects patriotism in the minds of 
young people with social reform and democratic struggle. A Rortyan history would 
be taught with a relatively neutral rather than an overly moralistic tone, similar to 
what Spickard (2007) outlines:   
Some readers [of Almost All Aliens] may make the mistake of thinking that 
there is a political agenda behind the writing of this book. Th at is not true. 
. . . It is not a book about what we should do. It is about what we have done. 
Our past is our past; there is no point in hiding from it or making up a dif-
ferent past in order to make us feel better about ourselves. (p. xx)
A Rortyan U.S. history curriculum would discuss the United States as a collective 
subject (not just its leaders) that has committed terrible as well as inspiring deeds. 
Rorty would have his heroes and heroines and even its unsung champions (e.g., 
Olson, 2001), but would avoid casting people or the nation as a whole in simple cat-
egories of good and evil. For example, even the darkest episode (along with slavery) 
of U.S. history, the genocide of American Indians and their removal onto reserva-
tions, would be taught without turning it into a moral drama. Instead of viewing 
the European settlers as villains and all Native Americans as virtuous, he would 
likely present the movement of European settlers as one of thousands of cultural 
confl icts that have taken place in human history. Neither ethno-racial group would 
be presented as superior to the other. Th e victory of European settlers over the fi rst 
immigrants to this continent would not be ascribed to intelligence, moral suprem-
acy, or the will of God, but the mismatch of power between hunting-gathering- and 
agricultural-metal-literary-based societies as well as contingent events such as the 
unintentional introduction of European germs that wiped out over 90% of eastern 
Native Americans between 1500 and 1600 (Diamond, 1999). Of course, there would 
be accounts of greedy and vicious Europeans, but also stories of individuals who, 
along with Native Americans, fought for Native American rights (and at times using 
questionable tactics). A Rortyan narrative would emphasize the events and people 
that have struggled to make the United States more inclusive, equitable, socially 
just, and democratic as well as less racist and imperialistic. 
Concerns 
Although a Rorty-inspired history curriculum is appealing, it also presents some 
signifi cant challenges. First is the obvious resistance that this curriculum would 
receive from the conservative citizens and organizations in our society. Most edu-
cators (e.g., Leming, Ellington, & Porter, 2003) who, like Rorty, want to increase the 
place of U.S. history in the K-12 curriculum, also advocate for a more traditional 
narrative rooted in and glorifying the country’s European leaders and presenting 
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the U.S. as a nation of few, if any, shortcomings. Th is resistance became clear during 
the debates over the National Standards for U.S. History produced during the 1980s 
and 1990s. Th is curriculum guide written by educators and historians emphasized 
the roles that all voluntary and involuntary immigrants have played in the making 
of our country. It also did not shy away from the darker events and moments of our 
nation’s past. Th e reaction from conservative news people, politicians, and activ-
ists demonstrated how diffi  cult it would be to create a Rortyan U.S. history in our 
K-12 schools (e.g., Evans, 2004; Nash, Crabtree, & Dunn, 1997; Symcox, 2002). Th e 
struggle over what historical narrative we teach our children has been extremely 
contentious throughout history (Moreau, 2004; Zimmerman, 2002). Th is confl ict 
should be expected as it is in the nature of liberal democracies to argue over which 
memories should be passed onto the next generation (VanSledright, 2008). Rorty’s 
U.S. history curriculum would certainly be a catalyst for a signifi cant culture war, 
which is perhaps why he (1998) called upon progressive thinking scholars to engage 
in “real” rather than merely intellectual politics. 
Th is struggle would be daunting, but worth the eff ort, given that the history 
taught to our children greatly infl uences our concept of who we are as a people. If 
children are taught that we have a shameful past, then conservatives will continue 
to dominate the content of this subject as Rorty (1999) noted in Education as So-
cialization and as Individualization. Given the conservative history and current 
political climate of the United States (although with a new administration this cli-
mate might change), an eff ort to write U.S. history textbooks and develop courses 
from a Rortyan perspective might fail. Nevertheless, courageous teachers have de-
veloped courses (e.g., Barton & Levstik, 2004; Grant, 2003; Yeager & Davis, 2005) 
that refl ect, to some degree, Rorty’s vision of our history with the help of curricu-
lum materials generated by groups such as Rethinking Schools, Facing History and 
Ourselves, Teaching Tolerance and younger children’s history magazines such as 
Cobblestone and Footsteps. 
A second concern regarding a Rortyan U.S. history curriculum would likely 
come from the left . Specifi cally, some individuals suggest Rorty’s view of history 
prevents him from recognizing contemporary injustices. For example, in response 
to the pride Rorty (1999) takes in the slow, painful, incomplete, but progressive re-
forms that have occurred in the United States (see p. 24), McLaren (2001) and his 
colleagues state:
He (Rorty) appears to have forgotten that the robber barons of yesterday 
have now been replaced by the global carpetbaggers of today; that white 
supremacy is alive and well throughout the United States, that violence 
against women, gays, and lesbians remains widespread. (pp. 150-151)
Of course, these and others (e.g., Allman, 2001; Brosio, 1994) interpret history from 
a Marxist perspective and argue social problems can’t be resolved as long as capi-
talism exists. Th ey do, however, raise an important question. Does Rorty’s focus on 
a progressive narrative of the United States, undermine or prevent young people 
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from wanting to confront serious social, political, and economic inequities found in 
contemporary society? Can our society substantively address these and other social 
problems without a history that clearly portrays the nation as wicked? Unless one 
is a Marxist, this argument simply is not convincing. To the contrary, a focus on 
the ways in which people have struggled to make this country a more inclusively 
democratic and socially just society would likely sensitize young people to these very 
issues. Although, a Rortyan U.S history would not portray the United States as an 
architectonic, evil power as envisioned by some Marxists, it would likely encour-
age young people of our country to embrace the values of social justice, inclusivity, 
anti-imperialism, and democracy far more than a Marxist history that would paint 
the United States as beyond redemption due to its capitalist economy. A Rortyan 
history would not induce the outrage among young people that a Marxist inspired, 
U.S. history curriculum would likely promote, but it would likely encourage young 
people to address the complex and diffi  cult social ills such as racism, sexism, and 
war within a liberal democratic, social welfare, capitalist state that we and other 
nations are becoming.
In summary, Rorty’s narrative would emphasize a social history that focuses 
on the struggles in which we have engaged to make our society live up to its ide-
alism as an expression of our patriotism. While not ignoring the dark side of our 
histories, it would do so without the excessive condemnation that some of our more 
radical colleagues would like to see, but would have little public support. Rather 
than view the government and other powerful spheres of society as evil or hypo-
critical (which at times they are), they would be portrayed as sites of contestation 
where, as citizens of unequal power, we form coalitions and engage one another. It 
would be a narrative that embraces those who have directly participated in these 
struggles, the ideals that motivated them to do so, and the tentative outcomes. Like 
many conservatives, Rorty wants a U.S. history that is patriotic, not because the 
government and its policies represent the best in humanity, but due to our willing-
ness to never give up on the American experiment.
Conclusion 
We have explored the implications of Rorty’s social theory for the teaching of U.S. 
history. We then considered, in an admittedly speculative manner, one way in which 
his ideas may guide our work in and thinking about this curriculum. Rorty’s work 
calls upon educators to embrace the ambiguity inherent in knowledge, and recognize 
and emphasize to our students its connection to given sources. Most importantly, 
Rorty wants us to develop a history that speaks to all of our citizens, unites us in 
our struggles with and against each other, and fosters a patriotic commitment to 
Dewey’s American experiment.
Rorty would likely advise us as educators to view our work as providing op-
portunities to progressively reform rather than “revolutionize” or “transform” the 
schooling of children. Th ese latter catch phrases (North, 2006) oft en make us feel 
good, but unnecessarily alienate us from the public at large. Although critique is 
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central to the work of academics, Rorty would challenge us to explore ways of do-
ing so without demeaning our nation or people. 
We conclude our discussion of Rorty’s U.S history curriculum by placing his 
work in its historical context. Rorty represents a classic case of social reproduction 
(Gross, 2008). His parents were deeply interested in left ist social theory and the hu-
manities. Rorty grew up during a time when many intellectuals were hopeful that 
some variation of Marx’s social and economic theories could be put into practice 
without resulting in totalitarianism. Eventually, his parents and their compatriots 
such as Sidney Hook (1975) recognized this could not be accomplished. Rorty re-
jected the new left ’s radicalism, and he came to share his parents’ ideas through his 
reading of Dewey’s social pragmatism. 
It seems as if Rorty’s work was an attempt to communicate with the young 
adults of our society. Th e subtext of his work seems to be saying, “Don’t make the 
same mistakes our generation did. Don’t get caught up in utopian or revolution-
ary rhetoric like so many of us did during the late 1960s. Avoid analyses of schools 
and society that result in making progressive schooling seem scary to the public at 
large. Most importantly, fi nd ways to bring left ist education and scholarship into 
the core narrative of the United States. As long as progressive ideas remain outside 
this narrative, its infl uence on our people and society will be limited.” 
Notes
1. As Bernstein (1990) noted, “By now Rorty has off ended and antagonized just about 
everyone—the political left  and right, traditional liberals, feminists, and both analytic and 
Continental philosophers. His ‘strong’ readings of key fi gures strike many as idiosyncratic 
creations of his own fantasies. He has been accused of being ‘smug,’ ‘shallow,’ ‘elitist,’ ‘prig-
gish,’ ‘voyeuristic,’ ‘insensitive,’ and ‘irresponsible.’ ‘Rorty-bashing’ is rapidly becoming a new 
culture industry” (p. 34).
2. Dewey’s notion of “warranted assertability” works well for not only the humanities 
and social sciences, but also the natural sciences. Scientists oft en preface their “truths” by 
saying, “Based upon what we know (cumulated information) at this time. . . .” Even in the 
natural sciences there is no need to posit “truths” as if they are timeless, immutable, and 
universal. Perhaps for this reason, many (e.g., Bontekoe, 1990; Prodo, 1988; Taylor, 1990) 
reject the correspondence theory of truth, but believe “truth,” is still worth pursuing. Others 
reject Rorty’s views and believe the quest for “truth” demands great respect (e.g., Diamond, 
1994; Gutting, 1999; Kane, 1993; Manning, 1992).
3. Many (e.g., Kohak, 1993; Viroli, 1995) disagree with Rorty and feel that “in the 
name of humanity” is a powerful catalyst for social and political justice. For example, Geras 
(1995) notes that many rescuers of Holocaust victims risked their lives not out of a sense of 
nationalism, but because they couldn’t tolerate the inhumanity of the German Reich. 
4. As the authors (2006) have discussed, both scientifi c and critical Marxism is deeply 
fl awed (e.g., Gouldner, 1979, 1980; Lovell, 1988). Reform left ists do agree with Marx that 
inequities are built into the economics of capitalism. However, simply stating that there are 
inequalities built into capitalism does not help us as a polity unless one has a viable and de-
monstratively better alternative vision of society. Unfortunately, as a theory upon which to 
build alternative societies, Marxism has shown itself, as illustrated by the numerous twen-
tieth-century experiments, to be a dismal failure (e.g., Burgler, 1990; Courtois, et al., 1999; 
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Dolot, 1985; Hosking, 1985; Kornai, 1992; Lazzerini, 1999; Meredith, 2002; Soltys, 1997; 
Tang, Toai, & Chanoff , 2000).
5. Unlike Spickard (2007), Rorty would likely not group all “Whites” into one category. 
Instead, he would note the struggles that the Irish, Jews, Italians and others have had as well 
as their desires to assimilate into the Anglo experience. He would, of course, also note that 
this success has been signifi cantly more diffi  cult for immigrants of color. 
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